Why Phenomenology Matters to Theology: Part I

Protestant Christian theology is in its second century of schism between liberal and conservative schools. I don’t think schism is too dramatic a term. As Brian McLaren prays, "Please, Lord, bring the day when we no longer think in these terms." Beneath this schism are fundamental differences in epistemology, in how we believe we can know God and God’s will. Nancey Murphy has made a very similar argument in the first half of her Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda.

While the conservative school argues from a foundational realist epistemology, and the liberal school proceeds from a postfoundational anti-realist epistemology (these terms will be fleshed out in later posts in this series), premodern philosophy and theology have lost their power over our convictions. This is because classical and medieval philosophy and theology were predominantly realist yet nonfoundationalist. The problematic introduced by modern philosophy was not realism, which was already a given in premodern thought, but rather foundationalism, which is central to the early modern philosophy of Descartes, Hobbes and Locke. Hence the conflation of foundationalism and realism, and the postmodern reaction against both. Renewing the Center, by Dr Stan Grenz (may he rest in peace), and Reclaiming the Center, by Erickson, Moreland, Carson, Groothius et al, are explicitly animated by these two epistemologies; neither book seriously engages premodern philosophy or theology, because premodern thought doesn’t fit into either school.

Neither does either school ever, ever, ever write about Edmund Husserl. He was one of the top 3 philosophers of the 20th century (by anyone’s count); postmodern thought would not be without Husserl’s concepts of absence and horizons; and Dr Dallas Willard, whose Christian writings are respected across both schools, spends much of his time reading Husserl. Why does Husserl matter? Why does phenomenology (the school of philosophy initiated by Husserl) matter?

First, Husserl articulated a nonfoundational realist epistemology that clarifies how philosophy should be done and was done before modernity. With Husserl’s help, we are now better able to read the works of premodern thinkers as they intended them to be read. This fact helps explain why much of the work being done with Husserl is done in Catholic philosophy departments, not to mention by the current Pope himself, who taught phenomenology at Lublin and wrote from a basically phenomenological position in his wonderful encyclical Faith and Reason. Another writer on Husserl, Msgr. Robert Sokolowski of The School of Philosophy at The Catholic University of America, has written the best Introduction to Phenomenology that exists. I can’t encourage readers enough to read it.

Second, Husserl’s nonfoundational realist epistemology provided the concepts of absence and horizons, later used by his student Martin Heidegger and future postmodern thinkers, that allow us to affirm and develop insights made by postmodern thinkers about the genealogy of concepts without taking the fateful postmodern step into anti-realism.  This unnecessary step into antirealism is prefigured by the modern conflation of foundationalism and realism against which postmoderns thinkers react. We can affirm absence within a realist epistemology. For example, phenomenology agrees that language pushes our interpretation of reality in one way or another, but it thoroughly rejects the claim that language precedes and completely structures consciousness. Instead, phenomenology describes the origins of language in the human subject’s free presentation and clarification of reality. Of course, much of reality is absent to the subject and is only a horizon of potential presence, and linguistic distinctions arising from such a partial presence of reality will push future understandings of reality in one or another direction. It is the job of the wise to recognize the element of language in the individual’s understanding of reality, and to help individuals and communities make better distinctions about reality based on their reflection and on their study of historical reflections on reality. Gordon Smith makes this argument in his Beginning Well, a commanding phenomenology of conversion, in which he calls on Christian leaders to thoughtfully clarify and expand the language of conversion-narratives, as the language of and distinctions made in such narratives allow the reality of conversion experiences to be more or less real and present, and therefore lasting, to the individual. Brian McLaren seems to be doing just this in his clarification of conversion to include reconciliation within the world. Dallas Willard provides us a similar phenomenology of revelation in his Hearing God, in which he affirms the reality of revelation without allowing revelation become a foundation for abstract propositions.

Third, and most importantly, leadership, discipleship and community stand or fall on our fundamental view of wisdom and virtue.  If wisdom is a community project in which noone’s perspective is privileged, because "all experience is hermeneutical", then clergy and lay leaders are reduced from disciplers of men to quasi-leaders who facilitate experience-sharing within communities of individuals on a spiritual journey together. Such leaders may, in Brueggemann’s terms, fund the experiences of their community with stories from Scripture, but the locus of wisdom still resides in the community’s hermeneutical activity, not in the Scripture nor, sadly, in the leader. If, on the other hand, wisdom is to be found in wise people and their writings (like Scripture) then leadership and discipleship take on very different roles. What makes a text the result of wisdom, and not just a text that happens to have become authoritative within one’s tradition? Great texts clarify reality. They make distinctions about reality that seem right, because when we consider such distinctions about reality, they allow reality to become more present and real to us. Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics does just this. This book was the authoritative ethics text for 2000 years because it embarked upon the study of ethics not with rationalist foundations, but by describing what ethical, virtuous people do. Nonfoundational realism at its best. Modern ethics, on the other hand, establishes premises on which elaborate ethical structures are built only to fall a generation later. (As happened when Eichmann articulately discussed Kantian ethics while on trial for Nazi atrocities.) The books of the Bible are written by some of the wisest men ever, and will never be exhausted of their complex insights into the reality of the human condition and man’s relationship with God. Willard reads the Bible in this way. Another such reader is Leon Kass, who brings out remarkable insights from Genesis in his The Genesis of Wisdom. Wise leaders, whether clergy or lay people, will immerse themselves in such books of wisdom so that they can become wise, and will lead others through their words and actions into better understandings of reality, and into greater coherence between their actions and their views of reality. When wisdom is lost, however, leadership and discipleship lose their purpose.

In future posts in this series, I will be discussing the foundationalist turn in modern thought, Husserl’s project, the differences between the two primary schools of Husserl studies, consequences for Scripture, consequences for leadership, and other topics that will no doubt arise from the wise clarifications and objections of readers.

Comments

[Paul H.]

Hey, Ken - as I mentioned at some point, I'm not sure that the East coast phenomenologists can take over the anti-realist postmodern genealogies without committing themselves to anti-realist positions, at least implicity. To accept Foucault's archaeology of knowledge, e.g., means that you accept the idea of knowledge as the will to power; you can't agree with his genealogy without also agreeing with his conclusion, in the case. This is not to say that one couldn't take over Derrida's deconstructive analysis of messianicity, or of hospitality; or any other number of more 'minor' issues that don't require the anti-realist claims that some of these analyses entail. I do think that Derrida's writings on the trace and absence in writing could be utilized safely, as long as absence is always seen as co-intending presence ... but it would be a slippery slope, to try to use anti-realist analyses in a nonfoundational realist sort of way.

[Paul H.]

I hasten to add, though, that I agreed with everything else you wrote.

[jm]

I am interested in learning more about the distinction between liberal and conservative schools in Protestant Christian Theology from the perspective of whether or not this is an illuminating dicotomy. At last check, there seemed to be several hundred (or thousand?) different Protestant denominations which distinguish themselves from one another on a very large variety of issues the least of which seems to be epistemological in nature. And if this is correct, I'm not so sure the term "schism" is appropriate since that implies a well defined subdividing into two halves. If you had said there is a set of schisms based on a grouping of fundamentally related issues, this would have been less distracting...at least in part because among Cathlics, the same would hold true to some extent--various ways of thinking about, believing and acting in accordance with various theological concepts. This accounts for the various orders in Catholic tradition with the only tangible difference between catholic orders and protestant denominations being, apparently, a pledge of cooperation of living out one's particular conception of christianity in cooperation with Rome....where cooperation is often a loose term which occasionally involves paying lip service to stiff, lazy Italians. (no disrespect intended for the heavily accomplished italians who don't see their country as heavan on earth) Paz!

[Paul H.]

The distinction between liberal and conservative Protestantism goes back to the late 18th century; it's just a way of differentiating between the two main academic camps, which are always split between people like Kierkegaard and people like Harnack---though there are of course other viewpoints within Protestantism.

[Napp]

Christians today are in desperate need of a phenomenological understanding of scripture. This is especially true, I think, of the Reformed tradition. I like to compare Calvin to Hobbs and the rational choice folks in political science (for a good discussion of "rat-choice" see, Cohn, "When did Political Science Forget about Politics?," The New Republic, Oct. 1999). All three of these presented ideas that were flawlessly logical and complete in their understandings, as long as you accepted their premises. All three were also afflicted with the sin of hubris. They assumed an ability to know more than they can know. We can never understand God to the extent that Calvin assumed. Our brains are too small. I think I'm agreeing with Ken when I say that there would be fewer divisions among Christians if we all had a better phenomonological understanding of scripture. I look forward to your future posts on this topic. --Napp

[Tony Jones]

Amen, Ken. I agree that phenomenology is the key, and that it's missing from the two books you mention. However, don't write off Gadamer, et al as mere relativists. Instead, the hermeneneutical crowd enriches the phenomenological crowd.

[Sivin]

I will be following your series ... fascinating read :-)

[Mark Diebel]

Thank you very much for this discussion! Don't forget some of the earlier phenomenologists... especially Goethe who was probably the first scientific phenomenologist... and from whom perhaps more than one stream of descendants have sprung.

[Dabodius]

I am sorry I can't add anything better just now than a couple of nitpicks:
Cicero's DE OFFICIIS vies with the NICOMACHEAN ETHICS for the title of "authoritative ethics text for 2000 years." Ambrose and Kant, for example, probably never read the Aristotle (nor did Cicero himself); Aquinas read both.
I have looked at Kass's GENESIS, though not read it through. It struck me as informed much less by phenomenology than by right-wing politics. As Kass (IIRC) admits, it was written in complete ignorance of the midrashic tradition. No wonder, then, it exemplifies a hermeneutic fallacy that also vitiates the literalist hermeneutic of fundamentalism: if you claim to read a text without presuppositions, you will simply read your own presuppositions into the text, unaware that you have done so. And to the extent that the text is authoritative, as Scripture is in the highest agree, you will find your own prior convictions affirmed, but authoritatively.
Plugs: David Woodruff Smith's MIND WORLD (Cambridge), while uneven, resembles a "Stanford School" counterpart to Sokolowki's "Washington School" introduction. Sokolowski and John Brough (when I studied with them) both spoke highly of Jitendranath Mohanty's interpretations of Husserl. And outside phenomenology, Newman set out a (philosophically) neglected non-foundationalism in GRAMMAR OF ASCENT and the UNIVERSITY SERMONS that preceded it.

[dr-ali]

My dear
I read your article & found it greatly intresting in trying to elucidate the importance of phenomenology in making our relgious life meaningful.
I need your comment on my work which is partially appeared in my blog,in which i am trying to show the phenomenological aspect in the koran. i am waitng your response.my blog name is koranic phenomenology
with my best wishes